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Abstract. This paper presents three new attacks on the RSA cryp-
tosystem. The first two attacks work when k RSA public keys (Ni, ei)
are such that there exist k relations of the shape eix−yiφ(Ni) = zi or of
the shape eixi − yφ(Ni) = zi where Ni = piqi, φ(Ni) = (pi − 1)(qi − 1)
and the parameters x, xi, y, yi, zi are suitably small in terms of the prime
factors of the moduli. We show that our attacks enable us to simulta-
neously factor the k RSA moduli Ni. The third attack works when the
prime factors p and q of the modulus N = pq share an amount of their
least significant bits (LSBs) in the presence of two decryption exponents
d1 and d2 sharing an amount of their most significant bits (MSBs). The
three attacks improve the bounds of some former attacks that make RSA
insecure.
Keywords: RSA, Cryptanalysis, Factorization, LLL algorithm, Simultaneous
diophantine approximations, Coppersmith’s method
1 Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem [14] is currently the most widely known and widely used
public key cryptosystem. The main parameters in RSA are the RSA modulus
N and the public exponent e. The modulus N = pq is the product of two
large primes of equal bit-size and e satisfies gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1 where φ(N) =
(p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler totient function. The integer d satisfying ed ≡ 1
(mod φ(N)) is the private exponent. The RSA cryptosystem is deployed in
various application systems for encryption, signing and for providing privacy
and ensuring authenticity of digital data. Therefore, most research is focused
on reducing the encryption/decryption execution time or the signature veri-
fication/generation time. For example, to reduce the decryption time or the
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signature generation time, one may wish to use a small private exponent d. Un-
fortunately, based on the convergents of the continued fraction expansion of eN ,
Wiener [19] showed that the RSA cryptosystem is insecure when d < N1/4.
Boneh and Durfee [3] proposed an extension of Wiener’s attack that allows the
RSA cryptosystem to be broken when d < N0.292. Their Method is based on
lattice basis reduction techniques. Similarly, Blo¨mer and May [2] proposed an
extension of Wiener’s attack and showed that the RSA cryptosystem is insecure
if there exist three integers x, y and z satisfying ex−yφ(N) = z with x < 13N1/4
and |z| < exN−3/4. Their method combines lattice basis reduction techniques
and the continued fraction algorithm. In general, the use of short secret expo-
nent encounters serious security problem in various instances of RSA. A typical
example is when a single user generates many instances of RSA (N, ei) with
the same modulus and small private exponents [8]. Another example is when
a single user generates k instances of RSA (Ni, ei), each with the same small
private exponent d. Using k equations eid− kiφ(Ni) = 1, Hinek [6] showed that
it is possible to factor the k modulus Ni if d < N
δ with δ = k2(k+1) − ε where ε
is a small constant depending on the size of maxNi. Similarly, to improve the
computational efficiency of server-aided signature generation (see [16]), one may
use RSA with a modulus N = pq such that the prime factors p and q share
a large number of least significant bits (LSBs). The security of this variant of
RSA has been analyzed under the partial key exposure attacks in [16], [17], [20],
and [18]. In [18], Sun et al. showed that RSA is more vulnerable in the situ-
ation when p and q share a large number of LSBs than the standard scenario
when the prime factors p and q differ in the first LSBs. When e = Nγ , they
showed that RSA is vulnerable if |p − q| = 2mx with 2m = Nα and d < Nδ
whenever δ < 76 − 23α − 13
√
(1− 4α)(1− 4α+ 6γ). For example, if γ = 1, and
α = 0.2, then δ < 0.662, that is, RSA is insecure if the private exponent is
such that d < N0.662. In [8], Howgrave-Graham and Seifert extended Wiener’s
attack in the presence of many decryption exponents for a single RSA modulus.
They showed that RSA is insecure if one knows two public exponents e1 and e2
such that the corresponding private exponents d1 and d2 satisfy d1, d2 < N
0.357.
In [11], Sarkar and Maitra improved this bound up to d1, d2 < N
0.416.
In this paper, we present three new attacks on RSA. The first attack works for
k ≥ 2 moduliNi = piqi, i = 1, . . . , k, when k instances (Ni, ei) are such that there
exist an integer x, k integers yi, and k integers zi satisfying eix− yiφ(Ni) = zi.
We show that the k RSA moduli Ni can be factored in polynomial time if
N = miniNi and
x < Nδ, yi < N
δ, |zi| < pi − qi
3(pi + qi)
yiN
1/4 where δ =
k
2(k + 1)
.
The second attack works when the k instances (Ni, ei) of RSA are such
that there exist an integer y, and k integers xi, and k integers zi satisfying
eixi−yφ(Ni) = zi. Similarly, we show that the k RSA moduli Ni can be factored
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in polynomial time if N = miniNi, mini ei = N
α, and
xi < N
δ, y < N δ, |zi| < pi − qi
3(pi + qi)
yN1/4 where δ =
(2α− 1)k
2(k + 1)
.
In both scenarios, we transform the equations into a simultaneous diophantine
problem and apply lattice basis reduction techniques to find the parameters
(x, yi) or (y, xi). This leads to a suitable approximation of pi + qi which allows
us to apply Coppersmith’s method [4] to compute the prime factors pi and qi of
the moduli Ni.
The third attack enables us to factor an RSA modulus N = pq when the
prime factors share their LSBs in the presence of two public exponents e1 and e2
such that the corresponding decryption exponents d1 and d2 share their MSBs.
To be more precise, suppose that e = Nγ , |p − q| = 2mx with 2m = Nα, and
|d1 − d2| < Nβ . We show that one can factor the RSA modulus if d1, d2 < N δ
under the condition
δ <
5
2
− 2α− β − 1
4
√
6(1− 4α)(5 + 4γ − 4α− 4β). (1)
As an example, observe that, in the situation that γ = 1, α = 0.2, and β = δ,
that is d1 and d2 differ in the first MSBs, then the condition (1) gives δ < 0.736
which improves the bound δ < 0.662 obtained in [18]. On the other hand, in the
standard situation γ = 1, α = 0, and β = δ, that is when the prime integers p,
q do not share any LSBs and d1, d2 do not share any MSBs, the condition (1)
gives δ < 0.422 which also improves the bound δ < 0.416 found in [11]. Our
method is based on Coppersmith’s method for solving polynomial equations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
the tools that we apply in the scenarios, namely Coppersmith’s method, lattice
basis reduction and simultaneous diophantine approximations. We also present
some useful results that will be used through the paper. In Section 3, we present
the first attack. In Section 4, we present the second attack and in Section 5, we
present the third attack. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give some basics on Coppersmith’s method, lattice basis
reduction techniques and simultaneous diophantine equations that will be used
in this paper.
2.1 Coppersmith’s method
At Eurocrypt’96, Coppersmith [4] proposed an algorithm for finding small roots
of bivariate integer polynomial equations in polynomial-time. The algorithm is
based on the LLL algorithm [10] for lattice reduction. A clever application of
Coppersmith’s algorithm is to factor an RSA modulus N = pq when half of the
least significant or most significants bits of p are known.
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Theorem 1 (Coppersmith). Let N = pq be the product of two unknown in-
tegers such that q < p < 2q. Given an approximation of p with additive error
term at most N
1
4 , then p and q can be found in polynomial time.
Coppersmith’s method has been heuristically extended to many variables. To
find the small roots of a multivariate polynomial f(x1, · · · , xn), we construct a
set of coprime polynomials with small coefficients which contain the same roots
over the integers. This can be done by applying the LLL algorithm to a lattice
that can be built using the strategy of Jochemsz and May [9]. To this end, a
practical way is the use the following result of Howgrave-Graham [7].
Theorem 2 (Howgrave-Graham). Let h(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Z[x1, · · · , xn] be a
polynomial with at most ω monomials. Suppose that h
(
x
(0)
1 , · · · , x(0)n
)
≡ 0
(mod R) where |x(0)i | < Xi for i = 1, . . . , n, and
h(x1X1, · · · , xnXn) < R√
ω
.
Then h
(
x
(0)
1 , · · · , x(0)n
)
= 0 holds over the integers.
To find the small roots of the first polynomials of the LLL-reduced basis, we can
use Gro¨bner bases or evaluation of resultants.
2.2 Lattice reductions and simultaneous diophantine
approximations
Let u1 . . . , ud be d linearly independent vectors of Rn with d ≤ n. The set of all
integer linear combinations of the vectors u1 . . . , ud is called a lattice and is in
the form
L =
{
d∑
i=1
xiui | xi ∈ Z
}
.
The set (u1, . . . , ud) is called a basis of L and d is its dimension. The determinant
of L is defined as det(L) = √det(UTU) where U is the the matrix of the ui’s
in the canonical basis of Rn. Define ‖v‖ to be the Euclidean norm of a vector
v ∈ L. A central problem in lattice reduction is to find a short non-zero vector in
L. The LLL algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lova´sz [10] produces a reduced
basis and answers positively but partially this problem. The following result fixes
the sizes of the reduced basis vectors (see [12]).
Theorem 3. Let L be a lattice of dimension ω with a basis {v1, . . . , vω}. The
LLL algorithm produces a reduced basis {b1, · · · , bω} satisfying
‖b1‖ ≤ ‖b2‖ ≤ · · · ≤ ‖bi‖ ≤ 2
ω(ω−1)
4(ω+1−i det(L)
1
ω+1−i ,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ω.
New Attacks on the RSA Cryptosystem 5
One important application of the LLL algorithm is that it provides a solution
to the simultaneous diophantine approximations problem which is defined as
follows. Let α1, . . . , αn be n real numbers and ε a real number such that 0 <
ε < 1. A classical theorem of Dirichlet asserts that there exist integers p1, · · · , pn
and a positive integer q ≤ ε−n such that
|qαi − pi| < ε for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In 1982, Lenstra, Lenstra and Lova´sz[10] described a method to find simul-
taneous diophantine approximations to rational numbers. In their work, they
considered a lattice with real entries. We state below a similar result for a lattice
with integer entries.
Theorem 4 (Simultaneous Diophantine Approximations). There is a
polynomial time algorithm, for given rational numbers α1, . . . , αn and 0 < ε < 1,
to compute integers p1, · · · , pn and a positive integer q such that
max
i
|qαi − pi| < ε and q ≤ 2n(n−3)/4 · 3n · ε−n.
Proof. See Appendix A. uunionsq
2.3 Primes sharing LSBs
The following lemma is reformulation of a result of [15]. It concerns an RSA
modulus N = pq when the prime factors p and q share an amount of their LSBs.
Lemma 1. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Suppose that
p−q = 2mu for a known value m. Then p = 2mp1 +u0 and q = 2mq1 +u0 where
u0 is a solution of the equation x
2 ≡ N (mod 2m) and p+ q = 22mv + v0 with
v0 ≡ 2u0 +
(
N − u20
)
u−10 (mod 2
2m).
Proof. See Appendix B. uunionsq
2.4 Approximations of the primes in RSA
Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Then p + q satisfies the
following inequalities (see [13])
2
√
N < p+ q <
3
√
2
√
N
2
. (2)
The following result shows that any approximation of p + q will lead to an
approximation of p.
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Lemma 2. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Suppose we know
an approximation S of p+ q such that S > 2N
1
2 and
|p+ q − S| < p− q
3(p+ q)
N
1
4 .
Then P˜ = 12
(
S +
√
S2 − 4N) is an approximation of p satisfying |p− P˜ | < N 14 .
Proof. See Appendix C. uunionsq
Remark 1. Notice that in Section 4.1.2 of the ANSI X9.31:1998 standard for
public key cryptography [1], there are a number of recommendations for the
generation of the primes in N = pq. One criteria is that the primes p, q shall
satisfy p− q > 2−100√N. Combining with (2) when q < p < 2q and N > 21024,
this implies that the term p−q3(p+q)N
1
4 satisfies
p− q
3(p+ q)
N
1
4 >
2−100
√
N
9
√
2
2
√
N
· 2256 = 2
157
9
√
2
.
This shows that, when N = pq > 21024 and the prime factors p and q are
chosen following the ANSI X9.31:1998 standard, the approximation extra term
(p−q)
3(p+q)N
1
4 of p+ q is not too small.
3 The First Attack on k RSA Moduli
In this section, we are given k ≥ 2 moduli Ni = piqi with the same size N . We
suppose in this scenario that the RSA moduli satisfy k equations eix−yiφ(Ni) =
zi. Notice that the parameters φ(Ni) = (pi − 1)(qi − 1) are also unknown. We
show that it is possible to factor the RSA moduli Ni if the unknown parameters
x, yi and zi are suitably small.
Theorem 5. For k ≥ 2, let Ni = piqi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, be k RSA moduli. Let
N = miniNi. Let ei, i = 1, . . . , k, be k public exponents. Define δ =
k
2(k+1) . If
there exist an integer x < N δ and k integers yi < N
δ and |zi| < pi−qi3(pi+qi)yiN1/4
such that eix − yiφ(Ni) = zi for i = 1, . . . , k, then one can factor the k RSA
moduli N1, · · ·Nk in polynomial time.
Proof. For k ≥ 2 and i = 1, . . . , k, the equation eix − yiφ(Ni) = zi can be
rewritten as eix− yi(Ni + 1) = zi − yi(pi + qi). Hence∣∣∣∣ eiNi + 1x− yi
∣∣∣∣ = |zi − yi(pi + qi)|Ni + 1 . (3)
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Let N = miniNi and suppose that yi < N
δ and |zi| < pi−qi3(pi+qi)yiN1/4. Then
|zi| < yiN1/4 < Nδ+ 14 . Since by (2) we have pi + qi < 3
√
2
2
√
N , we will get
|zi − yi(pi + qi)|
Ni + 1
≤ |zi|+ yi(pi + qi)
N
<
Nδ+1/4 + 3
√
2
2 N
δ+1/2
N
<
√
5Nδ+1/2
N
=
√
5Nδ−1/2.
Plugging in (3), we get ∣∣∣∣ eiNi + 1x− yi
∣∣∣∣ < √5Nδ−1/2.
We now proceed to prove the existence of the integer x. Let ε =
√
5Nδ−1/2,
δ = k2(k+1) . We have
Nδ = Nk/2−kδ < 2k(k−3)/4 · 3k ·
(√
5Nδ−1/2
)−k
= 2k(k−3)/4 · 3k · ε−k.
It follows that if x < Nδ, then x < 2k(k−3)/4 · 3kε−k. Summarizing, for i =
1, . . . , k, we have ∣∣∣∣ eiNi + 1x− yi
∣∣∣∣ < ε, x < 2k(k−3)/4 · 3k · ε−k.
It follows that the conditions of Theorem 4 are fulfilled which will find x and yi
for i = 1, . . . , k. Next, using the equation eix− yiφ(Ni) = zi, we get
pi + qi = Ni + 1− eix
yi
+
zi
yi
.
Since |zi| < pi−qi3(pi+qi)yiN1/4, then ziyi <
pi−qi
3(pi+qi)
N1/4 and Si = Ni + 1 − eixyi is
an approximation of pi + qi with an error of at most
pi−qi
3(pi+qi)
N1/4. Hence, using
Lemma 2, we can find an approximation P˜i =
1
2
(
Si +
√
S2i − 4Ni
)
of pi such
that |pi − P˜i| < N1/4. Then, for each i = 1, . . . , k, we find pi using Theorem 1.
This leads to the factorization of the k RSA moduli N1, . . . , Nk. uunionsq
Remark 2. It is conjectured in [3] that an RSA instance with a modulus N = pq
and a public exponent e is insecure if ed − yφ(N) = 1 with d < N1/2. This
conjecture can be related to Theorem 5 as follows. Suppose that k RSA moduli
N1, · · · , Nk and k public exponents e1, . . . , ek satisfy e1d−y1φ(N1) = 1 and eid−
yiφ(Ni) = zi, i = 2, . . . , k, where d < N
δ, yi < N
δ
1 and |zi| < pi−qi3(pi+qi)yiN1/4 with
δ = k2(k+1) . Then, by Theorem 5, one can factor the RSA moduli N1, · · · , Nk.
Observe that, for sufficiently large k, we have δ ≈ 12 , which answer positively
the conjecture in this case.
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Example 1. Consider the following 3 RSA moduli and public exponents
N1 = 1339354515091823859151801241, e1 = 1050185284614316002488409263,
N2 = 5761318740014279657192789531, e2 = 1492152853356436953159599262
N3 = 1257936900682879025849691469, e3 = 103918896908705941667125587.
Then N = max(N1, N2, N3) = 5761318740014279657192789531. Since k = 3,
we get δ = k2(k+1) = 0.375 and ε =
√
5Nδ−1/2 ≈ 0.000757. Using (11) with
n = k = 3, we find
C =
[
3n+1 · 2 (n+1)(n−4)4 · ε−n−1
]
= 123330787675873.
Consider the lattice L spanned by the matrix
M =

1 − [Ce1/(N1 + 1)] −dCe2/(N2 + 1)] − [Ce3/(N3 + 1)e
0 C 0 0
0 0 C 0
0 0 0 C
 .
Then, applying the LLL algorithm to L, we get a reduced basis with the matrix
K =

−3779027519,−18311525449,−3194797920,−5032583842
7689269805,−1894087712, 24623557005,−10208017761
33347077827,−5532195789,−23880055457,−2777199762
1955330759,−28195205997, 36977018712, 75348896931
 .
Next, computing K ·M−1, we observe that the first row is
[−3779027519,−2963128168,−978749302,−312187655],
from which we deduce x = 3779027519, y1 = 2963128168, y2 = 978749302 and
y3 = 312187655. Using x and yi for i = 1, 2, 3, define Si =
[
Ni + 1− eixyi
]
. We
get
S1 = 73202632183869, S2 = 152156156125079, S3 = 102878795201660.
For i = 1, 2, 3, let Di =
[√
S2i − 4Ni
]
. We get
D1 = 1098771258961, D2 = 10306351764921, D3 = 74513749733949.
By Lemma 2, for i = 1, 2, 3, P˜i =
1
2 (Si+Di) is a candidate for an approximation
of pi. Applying Coppersmith’s method 1 with P˜i for i = 1, 2, 3, we get
p1 = 37150702190747, p2 = 81231254125183, p3 = 88696272470797.
This leads us to the factorization of the 3 RSA moduli N1, N2 and N3. Observe
that x > N0.344 is much larger than Blo˝mer-May’s bound x < 13N
1/4. This shows
that Blo¨mer-May’s attack will not give the factorization of the RSA moduli in
this example.
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4 The Second Attack on k RSA Moduli
In this section, we consider the second scenario when the k RSA moduli satisfy
k equations of the shape eixi − yφ(Ni) = zi where the parameters xi, y and zi
are suitably small unknown parameters.
Theorem 6. For k ≥ 3, let Ni = piqi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, be k RSA moduli with the
same size N . Let ei, i = 1, . . . , k, be k public exponents with mini ei = N
α.
Let δ = (2α−1)k2(k+1) . If there exist an integer y < N
δ and k integers xi < N
δ and
|zi| < pi−qi3(pi+qi)yN1/4 such that eixi − yφ(Ni) = zi for i = 1, . . . , k, then one can
factor the k RSA moduli N1, · · ·Nk in polynomial time.
Proof. For i = 1, . . . , k, the equation eixi−yφ(Ni) = zi can be transformed into
eixi − y(Ni + 1) = zi − y(pi + qi). Hence∣∣∣∣Ni + 1ei y − xi
∣∣∣∣ = |zi − y(pi + qi)|ei . (4)
Let N = maxiNi. Suppose that y < N
δ and |zi| < pi−qi3(pi+qi)yN1/4. Also, suppose
that mini ei = N
α. Since by (2) we have pi + qi <
√
3
2
√
Ni, then we get
|zi − y(pi + qi)|
ei
≤ |zi|+ y(pi + qi)
Nα
<
Nδ+
1
4 + 3
√
2
2 N
δ+ 12
i
Nα
<
√
5Nδ+
1
2
Nα
=
√
5Nδ+
1
2−α.
Using this in (4), we get ∣∣∣∣Ni + 1ei y − xi
∣∣∣∣ < √5Nδ+ 12−α.
We now proceed to prove the existence of y and the integers xi. Let ε =√
5Nδ+
1
2−α, δ = (2α−1)k2(k+1) . We have
Nδεk = 5
k
2Nδ+kδ+
k
2−kα = 5
k
2 .
Then, since 5
k
2 < 2
k(k−3)
4 · 3k for k ≥ 2, we get Nδεk < 2k(k−3)/4 · 3k. It follows
that if y < N δ, then y < 2k(k−3)/4 · 3kε−k. Summarizing, we have∣∣∣∣Ni + 1ei y − xi
∣∣∣∣ < ε, y < 2k(k−3)/4 · 3k · ε−k, for i = 1, . . . , k,
It follows that the conditions of Theorem 4 are fulfilled and we will obtain y and
xi for i = 1, . . . , k. Next, by utilizing the equation eixi − yφ(Ni) = zi, we get
pi + qi = Ni + 1− eixi
y
+
zi
y
.
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Since |zi| < pi−qi3(pi+qi)yN1/4, then
|zi|
y <
pi−qi
3(pi+qi)
N1/4 and Si = Ni + 1 − eixiy is
an approximation of pi + qi with an error of at most
pi−qi
3(pi+qi)
N1/4. Hence, using
Lemma 2, we can find an approximation P˜i =
1
2
(
Si +
√
S2i − 4Ni
)
of pi such
that |pi − P˜i| < N1/4. Then, using Theorem 1, we find pi for i = 1, . . . , k. This
leads to the factorization of the k RSA moduli N1, . . . , Nk. uunionsq
Example 2. Consider the following three RSA moduli and three public exponents
N1 = 701404527220444023808491592451,
e1 = 598872437015970469816654047240,
N2 = 287595248854210987719090191831,
e2 = 166801923182837419445821944696,
N3 = 431174708848373283683684641751,
e3 = 373743791338260494286817160907.
Then N = max(N1, N2, N3) = 701404527220444023808491592451. We also get
min(e1, e2, e3) = N
α with α ≈ 0.9791. Since k = 3, we get δ = k(2α−1)2(k+1) =
0.359325 and ε =
√
5Nδ+1/2−α ≈ 0.000595. Using (11) with n = k = 3, let
C =
[
3n+1 · 2 (n+1)(n−4)4 · ε−n−1
]
= 323072188568099.
Consider the lattice L spanned by the the rows of the matrix
M =

1 − [C(N1 + 1)/e1] −dC(N2 + 1)/e2] − [C(N3 + 1)/e3e
0 C 0 0
0 0 C 0
0 0 0 C
 .
Then, applying the LLL algorithm to L, we get a reduced basis with the matrix
K =

9963214223 −13283752558 −23775330798 −12098528625
−23587427317 −20479775765 −11829398252 7542788188
−80616201478 123609103667 −102601176821 −4090837289
−641512285490 −64738610576 −108985237738 −147068239663
 .
Next, we get
K ·M−1 =

9963214223 11669001827 17178297583 11494200282
−23587427317 −27625796886 −40668787863 −27211962691
−80616201478 −94418385601 −138996218289 −93003999013
−41512285490 −48619544294 −71574331088 −47891223947
 .
From the first row, we deduce y = 9963214223, x1 = 11669001827, x2 =
17178297583, and x3 = 11494200282. Using y and xi for i = 1, 2, 3, define
Si =
[
Ni + 1− eixiy
]
. We get
S1 = 1677562597323852, S2 = 1169977613299368, S3 = 1377024442150848.
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For i = 1, 2, 3, let Di =
[√
S2i − 4Ni
]
. We get
D1 = 92726258730590, D2 = 467404129426390, D3 = 414122540907110.
By Lemma 2, for i = 1, 2, 3, P˜i =
1
2 (Si+Di) is a candidate for an approximation
of pi. Applying Coppersmith’s method 1 with P˜i for i = 1, 2, 3, we get
p1 = 885144428027221, p2 = 818690871362879, p3 = 895573491528979.
This leads to the factorization of the three RSA moduli N1, N2 and N3. Observe
that min(x1, x2, x3) > N
0.337 is much larger than Blo¨mer-May’s bound x <
1
3N
1/4. This shows that Blo¨mer-May’s attack does not work in this case.
5 The Third Attack on RSA With Primes and
Decryption Exponents Sharing Bits
In this section, we present the attack which applies when the prime factors of an
RSA modulus share an amount of their LSBs in the presence of two decryption
exponents d1 and d2 sharing an amount of their MSBs.
5.1 The attack
Theorem 7. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus such that p − q = 2mu where
2m ≈ Nα. Let e1 and e2 be two public exponents satisfying e1, e2 ≈ Nγ , e1d1 −
k1φ(N) = 1, and e2d2 − k2φ(N) = 1. Suppose that d1, d2 < N δ and |d1 − d2| <
Nβ. Then one can factor N in polynomial time if
δ <
5
2
− 2α− β − 1
4
√
6(1− 4α)(5 + 4γ − 4α− 4β).
Proof. Suppose that e1 and e2 are two public exponents satisfying e1d1−k1φ(N) =
1, e2d2− k2φ(N) = 1. Multiplying the first equation by e2 and the second by e1
and subtracting, we get
e1e2(d1 − d2)− e2k1φ(N) + e1k2φ(N) = e2 − e1. (5)
Suppose that p − q = 2mu. Then, Lemma 1 shows that p + q is in the form
p + q = v0 + 2
2mv where v0 ≡ 2u0 +
((
N − u20
)
u−10 (mod 2
2m)
)
and u0 is a
solution of the modular equation x2 ≡ N (mod 2m). Hence
φ(N) = N + 1− (p+ q) = N + 1− v0 − 22mv.
Plugging this in (5), we get
e1e2(d1 − d2)− e2k1
(
N + 1− v0 − 22mv
)
+ e1k2
(
N + 1− v0 − 22mv
)
= e2 − e1.
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which can be rewritten as
e1e2(d1 − d2)− e2(N + 1− v0)k1 + 22me2k1v + e1(N + 1− v0)k2
− 22me1k2v + (e1 − e2) = 0.
(6)
Fix the known and the unknown parameters as follows
a1=e1e2,
a2=−e2(N + 1− v0),
a3=2
2me2,
a4=e1(N + 1− v0),
a5=−22me1,
a6=e1 − e2,
and

x1=d1 − d2,
x2=k1,
x3=k2,
x4=v.
Hence, the equation (6) becomes a1x1 +a2x2 +a3x2x4 +a4x3 +a5x3x4 +a6 = 0.
Consider the polynomial
f(x1, x2, x3, x4) = a1x1 + a2x2 + a3x2x4 + a4x3 + a5x3x4 + a6.
Then (d1−d2, k1, k2, v) is a root of f(x1, x2, x3, x4) which can be small enough to
be found by Coppersmith’s technique. To find the small roots of f(x1, x2, x3, x4)
using this method, we use the extended strategy of Jochemsz and May [9]. We
will need the following bounds.
• max(e1, e2) = Nγ ,
• max(d1, d2) < Nδ,
• |d1 − d2| < X1 = Nβ ,
• k1 = e1d1−1φ(N) < X2 = Nγ+δ−1,
• k2 = e2d2−1φ(N) < X3 = Nγ+δ−1,
• p− q = 2mu with 2m = Nα and α < 14 .
• By (2) and Lemma 1, p+ q = 22mv + v0 with v < X4 = 3N1/2−2α.
Observe that α < 14 , otherwise p and q can be found using Coppersmith’s
metho [4]. Let us fix the bounds of the unknown parameters
X1 = N
β , X2 = N
γ+δ−1, X3 = Nγ+δ−1, X4 = 3N1/2−2α. (7)
Let m and t be two positive integers. Define the set
S =
⋃
0≤j≤t
{xi11 xi22 xi33 xi3+j3
∣∣∣ xi11 xi22 xi33 xi44 monomial of fm−1}.
and the set
M = {monomials of xi11 xi22 xi33 xi44 f
∣∣∣ xi11 xi22 xi33 xi44 ∈ S}.
Neglecting the coefficients, it is easy to find that fm−1(x1, x2, x3, x4) satisfies
fm−1(x1, x2, x3, x4) =
m−1∑
i1=0
m−1−i1∑
i2=0
m−1−i1−i2∑
i3=0
i2+i3∑
i4=0
xi11 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 .
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This leads to the characterization of the monomials xi11 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 of S:
xi11 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 ∈ S if

i1=0, . . . ,m− 1,
i2=0, . . . ,m− 1− i1,
i3=0, . . . ,m− 1− i1 − i2,
i4=0, . . . , i2 + i3 + t.
We also easily find
xi11 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 ∈M if

i1=0, . . . ,m,
i2=0, . . . ,m− i1,
i3=0, . . . ,m− i1 − i2,
i4=0, . . . , i2 + i3 + t.
Define
W = ‖f(x1X1, x2X2, x3X3, x4X4)‖∞
= max(|a1|X1, |a2|X2, |a3|X2X3, |a4|X4, |a5|X4X3, |a6|).
Then W satisfies
W ≥ |a2|X2 = e2(N + 1− v0)Nγ+δ−1 ≈ N2γ+δ. (8)
Next, define
R = WXm−11 X
m−1
2 X
m−1
3 X
m−1+t
4 .
Without loss of generality, suppose that a6 = e1 − e2 is coprime with R. We
define f ′(x1, x2, x3, x4) = a−16 f(x1, x2, x3, x4) (mod R) so that f
′(0, 0, 0, 0) = 1.
Next, define the polynomials
gi1,i2,i3,i4 = x
i1
1 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 f
′Xm−1−i11 X
m−1−i2
2 X
m−1−i3
3 X
m−1+t−i4
4 ,
with xi11 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 ∈ S,
hi1,i2,i3,i4 = x
i1
1 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 R,
with xi11 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 ∈M
∖
S.
The monomials of M
∖
S reduce to xi11 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 with (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ Si for
i = 1, 2, 3 where
S1 = {xi11 xi22 xi33 xi44 } for

i1=m,
i2=0, . . . ,m− i1,
i3=0, . . . ,m− i1 − i2,
i4=0, . . . , i2 + i3 + t.
S2 = {xi11 xi22 xi33 xi44 } for

i1=0, . . . ,m− 1,
i2=m− i1,
i3=0, . . . ,m− i1 − i2,
i4=0, . . . , i2 + i3 + t.
S3 = {xi11 xi22 xi33 xi44 } for

i1=0, . . . ,m− 1,
i2=0, . . . ,m− 1− i1,
i3=m− i1 − i2,
i4=0, . . . , i2 + i3 + t.
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As shown in [9], we use the coefficients of gi1,i2,i3,i4(x1X1, x2X2, x3X3, x4X4) and
hi1,i2,i3,i4(x1X1, x2X2, x3X3, x4X4) to build a basis of a lattice L with dimension
ω =
∑
x
i1
1 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 ∈M
1 =
1
12
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)(m+ 3)(m+ 2t+ 2).
The following ordering of the monomials is performed to construct an upper
triangular matrix: if
∑
ij <
∑
i′j then x
i1
1 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 < x
i′1
1 x
i′2
2 x
i′3
3 x
i′4
4 and if
∑
ij =∑
i′j then the monomials are lexicographically ordered. The diagonal entries of
the matrix are of the form{
(X1X2X3)
m−1Xm−1+t4 for the polynomials g
WXm−1+i11 X
m−1+i2
2 X
m−1+i3
3 X
m−1+t+i4
4 for the polynomials h.
Define
sj =
∑
x
i1
1 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 ∈M\S
ij , for j = 1, . . . , 4. (9)
The determinant of L is then
det(L) = W |M\S|X(m−1+t)|S|+(m−1+t)|M\S|+s44
3∏
j=1
X
(m−1)|S|+(m−1)|M\S|+sj
j
= W |M\S|x(m−1+t)ω+s44
3∏
j=1
X
(m−1)ω+sj
j .
All the polynomials g(x1, x2, x3, x4) and h(x1, x2, x3, x4) and their combinations
share the root (d1 − d2, k1, k2, v) modulo R. Applying the LLL algorithm to the
lattice L with the basis spanned by the polynomials g(x1X1, x2X2, x3X3, x4X4)
and h(x1X1, x2X2, x3X3, x4X4), we get a new basis with short vectors. Let
fi(x1X1, x2X2, x3X3, x4X4), i = 1, 2, 3 be three short vectors of the reduced ba-
sis. Each fi is a combination of g and h, and then share the root (d1−d2, k1, k2, v).
Then, by Theorem 3, we have for i = 1, 2, 3
‖fi(x1X1, x2X2, x3X3, x4X4)‖ < 2
ω(ω−1)
4(ω−2) det(L)
1
ω−2 .
For i = 1, 2, 3, we force the polynomials fi to satisfy Howgrave-Graham’s bound
‖fi(x1X1, x2X2, x3X3, x4X4)‖ < R√ω . A sufficient condition is
2
ω(ω−1)
4(ω−2 det(L)
1
ω−2 <
R√
ω
,
which can be transformed into det(L) < Rω, that is
W |M\S|x(m−1+t)ω+s44
3∏
j=1
X
(m−1)ω+sj
j <
(
WXm−11 X
m−1
2 X
m−1
3 X
m−1+t
4
)ω
.
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Using ω = |M | and |M | − |M\S| = |S|, we get
4∏
j=1
X
sj
j < W
|S|. (10)
Using (9), we easily get
s1 =
1
12
m(m+ 1)(m+ 2)(m+ 2t+ 1),
s2 =
1
24
m(m+ 1)(m+ 2)(3m+ 4t+ 5),
s3 =
1
24
m(m+ 1)(m+ 2)(3m+ 4t+ 5),
s4 =
1
24
(m+ 1)(m+ 2)(3m2 + 5m+ 8tm+ 6t+ 6t2).
Similarly, we get
|S| =
∑
x
i1
1 x
i2
2 x
i3
3 x
i4
4 ∈S
1 =
1
12
m(m+ 1)(m+ 2)(m+ 2t+ 1).
Set t = τm, then,
s1 =
1
12
(2τ + 1)m4 + o(m4),
s2 =
1
24
(4τ + 3)m4 + o(m4),
s3 =
1
24
(4τ + 3)m4 + o(m4),
s4 =
1
24
(6τ2 + 8τ + 3)m4 + o(m4),
|S| = 1
12
(2τ + 1)m4 + o(m4).
Using this, and after simplifying by m4, the inequation (10) transforms into
X
1
12 (2τ+1)
1 X
1
24 (4τ+3)
2 X
1
24 (4τ+3)
3 X
1
24 (6τ
2+8τ+3)
4 < W
1
12 (2τ+1).
Substituting the values of X1, X2, X3, X4 from (7) and W from (8), we get
1
12
(2τ + 1)β +
1
24
(4τ + 3)(γ + δ − 1) + 1
24
(4τ + 3)(γ + δ − 1)
+
1
24
(6τ2 + 8τ + 3)
(
1
2
− 2α
)
<
1
12
(2τ + 1)(2γ + δ),
or equivalently,
(6− 24α)τ2 + (8β + 8δ − 8− 32α)τ + 4γ + 4β + 8δ − 9− 12α < 0.
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For the optimal value τ = 2(1+4α−β−δ)3(1−4α) , this reduces to
−8δ2 +(40−32α−16β)δ+16α2−48γα+16βα+8α+28β−35+12γ−8β2 < 0,
which is valid if
δ <
5
2
− 2α− β − 1
4
√
6(1− 4α)(5 + 4γ − 4α− 4β).
Under this condition, we find four polynomials, namely f , f1, f2 and f3 with
the root (d1 − d2, k1, k2, v). Using the resultant technique, we find the solution
(d1 − d2, k1, k2, v). Using v, we compute p − q = 2mv. Since N = pq, we get
p2−2mvp−N = 0 which leads to the factorization of the RSA modulus N = pq.
This terminates the proof. uunionsq
5.2 Comparison with former attacks
We compare the bound on δ of Theorem 7 with two former bounds, namely the
bound obtained by Sarkar and Maitra in [11] and the bound obtained by Sun et
al. in [18].
5.2.1 Comparison with the bound of Sarkar and Maitra. In [11], Sarkar
and Maitra showed that for d1, d2 < N
δ, and |d1 − d2| < Nβ , RSA is insecure if
δ < 58− 12β. To compare this with the bound of Theorem 7, we consider γ = 1 and
α = 0 in the next result. This corresponds to the situation when e1 ≈ e2 ≈ N
and p and d differ in their first LSBs.
Corollary 1. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus. Let e1 and e2 be two public
exponents satisfying e1d1−k1φ(N) = 1, e2d2−k2φ(N) = 1. Suppose that d1, d2 ≤
Nδ and |d1 − d2| < Nβ. Then one can factor N in polynomial time if
δ <
5
2
− β − 1
4
√
6(9− 4β).
Proof. This is a direct application of Theorem 7 with γ = 1 and α = 0. uunionsq
In Table 1, we compare the bound δ < 58 − 12β. of Sarkar and Maitra and the
bound of Corollary 1 for various values of β = logN (|d1 − d2|).
β = logN (|d1 − d2|) β = 0.6 β = 0.5 β = 0.4 β = 0.3 β = 0.25
Bound for δ in [11] 0.325 0.375 0.425 0.475 0.5
Bound for δ in Corollary 1 0.326 0.379 0.434 0.489 0.517
Table 1. Comparison of the new method with the method of [11].
One may note that when d1 and d2 differ in their first MSBs, then β = δ and
the bound of Sarkar and Maitra is valid if δ < 512 ≈ 0.416, while the bound of
Corollary 1 gives δ < 0.422.
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5.2.2 Comparison with the bound in Sun et al. In [18], Sun et al. showed
that RSA is insecure when e = Nγ , p − q = 2mv with 2m = Nα, and d < Nδ,
if δ < 76 − 23α − 13
√
(1− 4α)(1− 4α+ 6γ). To compare our method with the
method of Sun et al., we consider Theorem 7 with β = δ, that is when d1 and
d2 do not share any amount of their MSBs. We get the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus such that p − q = 2mu where
2m ≈ Nα. Let e1 and e2 be two public exponents satisfying e1, e2 ≈ Nγ , and
e1d1−k1φ(N) = 1, e2d2−k2φ(N) = 1. Suppose that d1, d2 ≤ Nδ. Then one can
factor N in polynomial time if
δ <
17
16
− 1
4
α− 1
16
√
3(1− 4α)(3 + 32γ − 12α).
Proof. In the bound of δ in Theorem 7, if we plug β = δ and solve the inequation
for δ, we get the desired bound on δ. uunionsq
In Table 2, we compare the largest values of δ of Corollary 2 and the the largest
values obtained in [18] for various values of γ = logN (e) and α = logN (2
m).
γ = logN (e) γ = 1 γ = 0.9 γ = 0.8 γ = 0.7 γ = 0.6
Bound for δ in [18] with α = 0 0.284 0.323 0.363 0.406 0.451
New bound for δ with α = 0 0.422 0.452 0.483 0.516 0.552
Bound for δ in [18] with α = 0.1 0.436 0.467 0.500 0.534 0.570
New bound for δ with α = 0.1 0.550 0.573 0.598 0.625 0.653
Bound for δ in [18] with α = 0.2 0.662 0.680 0.699 0.720 0.742
New bound for δ with α = 0.2 0.736 0.750 0.764 0.780 0.797
Bound for δ in [18] with α = 0.25 1 1 1 1 1
New bound for δ with α = 0.25 1 1 1 1 1
Table 2. Comparisons of the new method with the method of [18] for α = logN (2
m).
6 Conclusion
For k ≥ 2 and i = 1, . . . , k, let (Ni, ei) be k RSA instances with k moduli Ni =
piqi and k public exponents ei. In this paper, we proposed a new method to factor
all the RSA moduli N1, . . . , Nk in the scenario that the RSA instances satisfy
k equations of the shape eix− yiφ(Ni) = zi or of the shape eixi − yφ(Ni) = zi
with suitably small parameters xi, yi, zi, x, y where φ(Ni) = (pi − 1)(qi − 1).
We also proposed an attack on RSA when the prime factors p and q of the RSA
modulus N = pq are of the same bit-size. The attack factors N when p and q
share a number of their least significant bits (LSBs) in the presence of two public
exponents e1 and e2 with decryption exponents d1 and d2 sharing an amount of
their most significant bits (MSBs).
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A Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let ε ∈ (0, 1). Set
C =
⌈
3n+1 · 2 (n+1)(n−4)4 · ε−n−1
⌉
, (11)
where dxe is the integer greater than or equal to x. Consider the lattice L spanned
by the rows of the matrix
M =

1 − [Cα1] − [Cα2] · · · − [Cαn]
0 C 0 · · · 0
0 0 C · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · C
 ,
where [x] is the nearest integer to x. The determinant of L is det(L) = Cn and
the dimension is n + 1. Applying the LLL algorithm, we find a reduced basis
(b1, · · · , bn+1) with
‖b1‖ ≤ 2n/4 det(L)1/(n+1) = 2n/4Cn/(n+1).
Since b1 ∈ L, we can write b1 = ±[q, p1, p2, . . . , pn]M , that is
b1 = ± [q, Cp1 − q [Cα1] , Cp2 − q [Cα2] , · · · , Cpn − q [Cαn]] , (12)
where q > 0. Hence, the norm of b1 satisfies
‖b1‖ =
(
q2 +
n∑
i=1
|Cpi − q [Cαi] |2
)1/2
≤ 2n/4Cn/(n+1),
which leads to
q ≤
⌊
2n/4Cn/(n+1)
⌋
and max
i
|Cpi − q [Cαi]| ≤ 2n/4Cn/(n+1). (13)
Let us consider the entries qαi − pi. We have
|qαi − pi| = 1
C
|Cqαi − Cpi|
≤ 1
C
(|Cqαi − q[Cαi]|+ |q[Cαi]− Cpi|)
=
1
C
(q|Cαi − [Cαi]|+ |q[Cαi]− Cpi|)
≤ 1
C
(
1
2
q + |q[Cαi]− Cpi|
)
.
Using the two inequalities in (13), we get
|qαi − pi| ≤ 1
C
(
1
2
· 2n/4Cn/(n+1) + 2n/4Cn/(n+1)
)
=
3 · 2(n−4)/4
C1/(n+1)
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Observe that (11) gives
3n+1 · 2 (n+1)(n−4)4 · ε−n−1 ≤ C ≤≤ 3n+1 · 2 (n+1)(n−3)4 ε−n−1, (14)
which leads to ε ≥ 3·2(n−4)/4
C1/(n+1)
. As a consequence, we get |qαi − pi| ≤ ε. On the
other hand, using (13) and (14) , we get
q ≤
⌊
2n/4Cn/(n+1)
⌋
≤ 2n/4Cn/(n+1) ≤ 2n(n−3)/4 · 3n · ε−n.
To compute the vector [q, p1, p2, . . . , pn], we use (12)
[q, p1, p2, . . . , pn] = ± [q, Cp1 − q [Cα1] , Cp2 − q [Cα2] , · · · , Cpn − q [Cαn]]M−1.
This terminates the proof. uunionsq
B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose that p− q = 2mu. Then p = q+ 2mu and N = q2 + 2muq. Hence
q2 ≡ N (mod 2m). Let u0 be a solution of the congruence x2 ≡ N (mod 2m).
For m ≤ 2, this equation has only one solution and for m ≥ 3, there are four
solutions that can be found in polynomial time using Hensel’s Lemma. Then
q ≡ u0 (mod 2m) for one of the solutions u0 which implies that q = 2mq1 + u0
for a positive integer q1. Now, we have
p = q + 2mu = 2mq1 + u0 + 2
mu = 2m(q1 + u) + u0 = 2
mp1 + u0,
where p1 = q1 + u. Using N = pq, we get
N = (2mp1 + u0) (2
mq1 + u0) = 2
2mp1q1 + 2
mu0(p1 + q1) + u
2
0.
From this, we deduce 2mu0(p1 + q1) + u
2
0 ≡ N (mod 22m). Since u0 is odd, we
obtain
2m(p1 + q1) ≡
(
N − u20
)
u−10 (mod 2
2m),
which can be rewritten as 2m(p1 + q1) = 2
2mv + t0 with
t0 ≡
(
N − u20
)
u−10 (mod 2
2m).
Finally, we get
p+ q = 2mp1 + u0 + 2
mq1 + u0
= 2m(p1 + q1) + 2u0
= 22mv + t0 + 2u0
= 22mv + v0,
where v0 = t0 + 2u0. This terminates the proof. uunionsq
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C Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose that S > 2N
1
2 and let D =
√
S2 − 4N . We have∣∣(p− q)2 −D2∣∣ = ∣∣(p− q)2 − S2 + 4N ∣∣ = ∣∣(p+ q)2 − S2∣∣ .
Dividing by p− q +D, we get
|p− q −D| = (p+ q + S)|p+ q − S|
p− q +D
Next, suppose |p+ q − S| < p−q3(p+q)N
1
4 . Since p−q3(p+q)N
1
4 < N
1
4 , then
p+ q + S < 2(p+ q) +N
1
4 < 3(p+ q).
Combining with p− q +D > p− q, we deduce
|p− q −D| < 3(p+ q)|p+ q − S|
p− q <
3(p+ q)
p− q ·
p− q
3(p+ q)
N
1
4 = N
1
4 .
Now, set P˜ = 12 (S +D). We have∣∣∣p− P˜ ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣p− 12 (S +D)
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
|p+ q − S + p− q −D|
≤ 1
2
· |p+ q − S|+ 1
2
|p− q −D|
<
1
2
· p− q
3(p+ q)
N
1
4 +
1
2
N
1
4
< N
1
4 ,
where we used 12 · p−q3(p+q) < 12 . This terminates the proof. uunionsq
